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The Retail Distribution Review: problems, 
responsibilities and regulation   
 © Patrick John Ring, Glasgow School for Business and Society, 2015 
Introduction and Aim 
Context 
… the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) is one of the core strands of our retail 
market strategy ……. It is essential for promoting a resilient, effective and 
attractive retail investment market. The RDR will modernise the industry, giving 
more consumers confidence and trust in the market at a time when they need more 
help and advice with their retirement and savings planning. (FSA, 2008a:3) 
The Retail Distribution Review (RDR), which came fully into effect at the beginning of 2013, 
is the most recent in a series of regulatory reforms in the UK retail advice sector.  Its stated 
aim is to create a competitive advice market which provides clarity and innovation in relation 
to retail financial products and services, along with adviser professionalism that inspires trust 
and enables consumers to have their needs addressed (FSA, 2009a:5).  
Many would argue this was not a moment too soon.  A line of scandals, including endowment 
mortgages, personal pensions and split capital bonds (Black, 2002; Dunn, 2009; Goff and 
Cadman, 2014), suggested previous reforms had limited effect on the advice market and 
consumer outcomes.  As the Financial Services Authority (FSA) itself put it in 2007: 
there are features associated with the distribution of retail investment products 
that result in inefficiencies for the market and poor outcomes for consumers. This 
is despite intensive regulation in this area for nearly two decades. (FSA, 2007:12) 
The RDR changes take effect at an important juncture in UK retail financial services.  The 
automatic enrolment of individuals into pension arrangements, as well as the introduction of 
pension ‘freedoms’, respectively ‘nudge’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) and entice individuals 
into having to make more, and more complicated, financial decisions.  Such decisions involve 
the management of financial risk to ensure secure long-term outcomes.  As a consequence, 
the issue of the availability of quality advice takes on greater significance.  
Previous reforms 
“A principal aim of regulation is to deal with market failures. These have 
manifested themselves in various ways in the distribution of retail investment 
products. We are using this review to address these issues….” (FSA, 2007:15) 
Market failure is a driver of the RDR, but was also the motivation behind previous significant 
reforms in the retail advice market.  In 2004, the FSA attempted to increase choice and 
competition on the supply side by introducing the concept of a ‘multi-tied’ adviser, who 
could advise on the products of a number of provider companies (up until then advisers had 
to advise on the whole market, or advise on just one provider’s products). The intention was 
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to increase the product choice available to consumers. (FSA, 2002a; FSA, 2003).  On the 
demand side, reforms included increased disclosure of information, particularly about product 
charges.  Here, the regulator argued that 
 “We expect the initial disclosure information to influence consumers’ own 
decisions — before taking financial advice — about whether the services being 
offered are right for them. This in turn may empower customers (in that it would 
give them an idea of what to expect) and encourage ‘shopping around’ — neither 
of which is common in the current retail financial services market.” (FSA, 2003, 
Appendix D: 27)  
Yet, by 2007 it had become clear that attempts to improve the supply side had created a lack 
of clarity for consumers about the status of advisers and the nature of the advice on offer.  
The FSA then indicated it needed to “improve the clarity for consumers of the characteristics 
of different service types and the distinctions between them” (FSA, 2008a:3).  At the same 
time, it recognised the cost of advice meant that, in some cases, those who could afford to 
save could not afford the advice to enable them to make appropriate savings decisions (FSA, 
2007). Payment for advice using commission was coming under increasing criticism.  It was 
also clear that many consumers no longer felt able to trust the financial advice sector (FSA, 
2008b; Ring, 2012)  
Aim of article 
This article therefore critically examines the potential of the RDR to create the kind of advice 
market envisaged by the regulator.  This takes on particular important in the light of the 
recent announcement that government is again reviewing the regulatory framework of the 
financial advice market (HM Treasury, 2015). The analysis focuses on three key issues: 
clarity, cost and consumers.  It argues that whilst the RDR has proved to be relatively 
successful in some regards it have also run up against difficulties, as did the de-polarisation 
reforms before it.   
The discussion begins by examining the rationale for the reforms, before going on to consider 
RDR in the context of clarity, cost and consumer outcomes. First, it examines the notion of 
‘advice’, arguing that the RDR has created confusion in what is already a complex financial 
market.  Second, it examines reforms of the method of payment for advice, suggesting that 
whilst they have some benefits, they have also created challenges for consumers seeking 
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advice. Finally, it examines the attitudes and behaviour of financial consumers and suggests 
that this creates range of problems and difficulties in this new advice landscape. 
RDR Reforms 
Following upon 18 Consultation Papers, 5 Discussion Papers, 15 Policy Statements and 17 
separate pieces of research, the implementation of reforms constituting the RDR was 
completed on 31
st
 December, 2012 (FSA, 2015).  The reforms have three main strands.   The 
first concerns advisers and the service they provide.  Under the RDR, advisers must either be 
‘independent’, taken to mean providing unbiased, unrestricted advice based on a 
comprehensive and fair analysis of the relevant market; or be restricted, a term capturing the 
provision of any advice which is not independent.  The nature of the service being provided 
must be disclosed to the client in writing.  The aim is to provide greater clarity for customers 
(FSA, 2009a). 
Second, the payment of product provider commission to advisers recommending provider 
products to clients is now prohibited.  Instead, advisers can only be remunerated by ‘adviser 
charges’, agreed with the client at the start of the advice process. The intention is to avoid any 
potential of commission bias influencing adviser recommendations (FSA, 2009a:23).  Third, 
advisers must pass exams at a level equivalent to the first year of a University degree before 
they can provide advice, in order to “deliver standards of professionalism that inspire 
consumer confidence and build trust” (FSA, 2009a:40). Thereafter, they must meet annual 
CPD requirements as well as following a Code of Ethics. 
It was argued these reforms would “deliver more clarity” in relation to products and services, 
establish “remuneration arrangements that allow competitive forces to work in favour of 
consumers”, and  create an advice market where consumers can “have their needs and wants 
addressed” (FSA, 2007:17). The removal of commission is regarded as important for 
increasing consumer perceptions of professionalism and trust.  At the same time, the 
regulator believes that transparency in the cost of advice can enable consumers to exert more 
influence in the financial advice marketplace (FSA, 2007).  
We now turn to examine these reforms in the context of the three issues already identified: 
clarity, cost and consumers.   
Delivering Clarity - From intention to reality 
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Under the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) Regulated Activities order, for advice to be 
regulated it must be given to a person or their agent, concern a specific investment, and relate 
to whether that investment should be made or not.  If the ‘advice’ does not have all of these 
characteristics, then it is not ‘regulated’ advice but ‘generic’ advice, and not a concern of the 
regulator.  For example, advice to buy shares in the oil sector or in a particular country would 
be generic advice as it does not relate to a specific investment. It would not be covered by the 
FCA’s regulatory protections.  In the retail sector, however, advice will normally include a 
personal recommendation of a specific investment, and so be regarded as regulated advice.  
As part of the RDR’s consultation, the regulator had initially proposed a simple distinction 
between advice and sales with ‘advice’ being regarded as advice across the whole of the 
market on a fee only basis i.e. ‘independent’ advice.  However, given the terms of existing 
European legislation, and the effect it was argued such a change would have on the 
marketplace, the proposal was considered unfeasible (FSA, 2008a). This eventually led to the 
creation of a distinction between ‘independent’ advice and ‘restricted’ advice. 
Regulatory requirements mean that a recommendation for retail investment products must be 
‘suitable’; that is, it must take account of the personal circumstances of the client. 
Independent advice is distinguished by defining ‘suitability’ to mean that independent advice 
must be based on a comprehensive and fair analysis of the relevant market which is unbiased 
and unrestricted.  The ‘relevant market’ comprises all retail investment products which are 
capable of meeting the investment needs and objectives of a client.  That requires an advisor 
look at the whole market of possible retail investment products, although in practice it is 
possible for an advisor to provide less comprehensive advice where she comes to the 
conclusion that the client’s needs can only be met by a limited market, or where she holds 
herself out as being ‘independent’ but only in relation to a (limited) ‘relevant market’.  In 
sum, it is possible for ‘independent’ advice to have restrictions.  A firm must indicate where 
independent advice is being provided in relation to a limited market. 
As regards the regulator’s rule book definition of ‘restricted advice’, it is defined as advice 
which is neither independent advice nor basic advice (basic advice is simplified advice 
relating only to stakeholder pension arrangements).  There is no further regulatory definition 
of restricted advice, although the regulator has indicated that, as regards suitability, restricted 
advice can be limited both in relation to its focus (e.g. relating only to specific identifiable 
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needs of clients) as well to the range of product providers in relation to which that advice is 
provided (FSA, 2008a). 
In discussing restricted advice, the FCA also refers to firms offering ‘limited’ or ‘focused’ 
advice; terms which it appears to use interchangeably, but neither of which are defined 
regulatory terms. In either case, it is referring to advice focused on a specific need of the 
customer that does not require the adviser to take account of the full personal circumstances 
of the client in considering the suitability of the product.  Given the limitations that can apply 
to independent advice, the regulator has acknowledged that it is possible focused/limited 
advice could meet the definition of independent or restricted advice (FSA, 2012).  To perhaps 
complicate matters further, it is also possible for a single adviser firm to offer both 
independent and restricted advisory services.   
The regulator has also been keen for the industry to offer some form of less costly advice 
falling short of the requirements of independent and restricted advice: “This concept could be 
likened to an off-the-peg suit as opposed to a bespoke suit.” (FSA, 2007:60).  It has therefore 
issued guidance on what it refers to as ‘simplified’ advice (FSA, 2012), although again this is 
not a term defined in the regulator’s rulebook.  It notes that this “has some similar 
characteristics to ‘focused advice’” (FSA, 2012:2), and might be characterised as restricted 
advice that involves streamlined (generally assumed to be automated) processes. 
Ironically, in a drive for greater clarity, it now appears we have an advice landscape that, as 
far as the regulator is concerned, includes regulated, independent, restricted, focused, 
simplified, basic and generic advice.   It might be said there is a ‘continuum’ of advice which, 
based on past experience (Ring, 2004), could lead to consumer confusion and provide ample 
scope for dubiety and for consumers to be misled.  Research undertaken for the FCA in 2013 
indicated significant confusion between independent and restricted advice amongst 
consumers (NMG Consulting, 2013).  Whilst disclosure of these terms by firms to clients in 
conformity with regulatory requirements may have improved in recent times (FCA, 2014a 
and 2014b), “consumer research indicates that differences between independent and restricted 
advice are still complex and confusing for consumers” (Europe Economics, 2014:33).   
It is worth noting here that one piece of research (NMG Consulting, 2014b) conducted for the 
FCA indicates that the majority of consumers were clear whether they were receiving 
regulated financial advice or not.  However, this was when they were told before answering 
the question that it meant what they had received ‘is a tailored recommendation from a 
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qualified individual given after due consideration of your personal circumstances and 
objectives, so they recommend products or give you advice that is suitable only for you’. 
They may have been clear they did not receive this specific service; however, as the Financial 
Services Consumer Panel (Advice Gap, 2012) has noted, consumers interpret the word 
“advice” in a much broader and more elastic way which can introduce dubiety and confusion.  
For example, there is evidence indicating many consumers believe all regulated financial 
advice is independent (NMG Consulting, 2014a).  The potential for confusion is neatly 
illustrated by the FCA itself:  
 “Firms should be mindful that if a recommendation is put forward in such a way 
that a reasonable observer would view it as being based on a consideration of a 
customer’s circumstances or presented as suitable, then this is likely to amount to 
a personal recommendation. However, while the customer’s own perception of the 
service received is very important, it is feasible that the customer will not always 
be correct in their understanding.” (FCA, 2014c:41) 
Importantly, none of this is taking place in a vacuum. Government has been keen to 
encourage financial ‘guidance’, something that falls short of regulated advice (FCA, 2014c). 
Unfortunately, the clarity of the difference between the two is debatable (Hamilton, 2014).  In 
addition, the UK’s main provider of financial guidance refers to its ‘own free and impartial 
advice service’ (the Money Advice Service, 2014) and the organisations delivering the 
Government’s new Pensions Wise pension information service are The Pensions Advisory 
Service and the Citizens Advice Bureau (Cumbo, 2014). It is perhaps no surprise that the ABI 
has sought clarity on the distinction between full advice and the provision of information 
(Norman, 2015a). 
Cost 
An important element of the RDR reforms was the requirement that advisers can no longer be 
paid for the advice they provide to their customer through commission from a product 
provider.  Instead clients pay adviser charges, agreed with the adviser at the start of the 
advice process. The ban includes ongoing annual commission, previously often a means of 
stretching the payment of commission by the product provider over a longer period (in 
contrast to a ‘one off’ payment).  Now, ongoing payments must also be agreed between the 
client and their adviser, and tied to the provision of a specific ongoing service for those 
payments. 
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This reform has two key objectives.  Firstly, “to reduce the potential for remuneration to 
influence adviser recommendations, directly or indirectly” (FSA, 2009a:23).  Secondly, the 
regulator’s intention is to increase competition.  If the cost of the advice is not ‘hidden’ in the 
cost of the product, the cost of both the advice and the product is clearer to the customer 
(FSA, 2008a).  There is no doubt that the move to fee based remuneration, alongside the 
RDR’s focus on professionalism, is a positive step in attempting to enhance the image of the 
advice sector and increase the transparency and trust that should be the essence of the advice 
relationship (see NMG Consulting, 2014b) but which has suffered in the wake of various 
scandals.   
 
That said, there are a number of difficulties that remain. For example, if disclosing the cost of 
advice is meant to enhance competition, it should be noted that even before the RDR reforms, 
the cost of the commission, in monetary terms, had to be made clear to the client. Yet 
awareness of the relevance of this figure was traditionally poor (FSA, 2004).  In any event, 
both previous and more recent consumer research suggests price is not the major factor when 
consumers choose an adviser (FSA, 2002b; NMG Consulting, 2014b).  Recent research in 
relation to ongoing charges also found that nearly half of those surveyed did not know they 
were actually paying for ongoing financial advice; and even a majority of those who did 
know were not aware of how much they were paying (NMG Consulting, 2014c).  As research 
conducted for the regulator notes, all of this “suggests that switching or shopping around 
among consumers would not increase significantly, even in the event of full compliance with 
transparency and disclosure requirements” (Europe Economics, 2014:34).    
 
Of course, all this assumes that charges are being properly and adequately disclosed.  A 
Thematic review by the FCA in 2014 found half of firms reviewed failed to meet regulatory 
requirements to give clients clear upfront generic information on how much their advice 
might cost, as well as failing to give clear information to clients as to what advice would cost 
them as individuals (FCA, 2014a).  Just as worryingly, whilst the ‘unbundling’ of charges as 
between product providers and advisers is a step towards greater transparency in relation to 
overall costs, there is still much work to be done to separate out the various different costs 
within the investment value chain. Evidence suggests “that many investment managers are 
themselves unaware of the costs ….. to which they are committing client money” (Pitt-
Watson et al., 2014:7). Aside from the cost of advice, the other costs of incurred as a result of 
an adviser’s recommendation are far from clear (FSCP, 2014).   
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The move to fee-based advice has also led advisers to look at their business models (Clare et 
al. 2013; Hines and Siddle, 2013; JP Morgan Asset Management, 2012). The RDR has 
increased the cost of advice and, in conjunction with the removal of commission, has reduced 
the opportunities for client cross-subsidy (BDO 2012: Clare et al, 2013; Fundscape, 2014). 
This has brought about a ‘re-alignment’ of the provision of advice.  There is evidence that the 
reforms have taken the cost of advice out of the reach of many consumers; more properly put, 
it has either put off many consumers from taking advice or made them unprofitable for 
financial advisers (Deloitte 2012 and 2013).  It has been suggested that clients need 
somewhere between £61,000 and £100,000 of investible assets to be profitable for an adviser, 
although it is estimated around 75% of the population do not own over £60,000 of assets. 
(Clare et al, 2013; Fundscape, 2014)  It is no surprise, then, that nearly half of advisers polled 
in one survey considered the ‘mass’ advice market to be ‘unattractive’, and 25% ‘very 
unattractive’ (Clare et al., 2013:10); that advisers are segmenting their customer base, 
generally focusing on high net worth clients (Europe Economics, 2014; Fundscape, 2014); 
and that banks are moving out of the mass advice market (Fundscape, 2014). 
 
At the same time, many consumers have expressed a general unwillingness to pay ‘up front’ 
fees, with a survey by Deloitte (2012) indicating that around one third of investors would 
cease using advisers if charged directly. The figures were more stark in a subsequent survey, 
which also found half of those willing to pay a fee were unwilling to pay more than £50 per 
hour, when the average fee was estimated to be £165 per hour (Clare, 2013).  More recently, 
one survey found retirees indicating they would be prepared to pay, on average, a total of 
£253 for advice (Holt, 2015). By contrast, other research (CII, 2013; NMG Consulting, 
2014b) has indicated that the cost of advice may not be the main reason for individuals not 
seeking advice, although it does not indicate the extent it might nevertheless be a contributing 
factor. 
 
One final point to note on cost is the prevalence of fee charging on the basis of a percentage 
of the funds invested (Europe Economics, 2014).  To the extent that advisers are providing an 
ongoing service – usually an annual review – one wonders about the degree to which the 
amount of time, effort and cost expended  annually on the client (even taking into account the 
costs of professional indemnity) are accurately reflected by a level percentage of a (generally 
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increasing) fund.  That said, given the level of client awareness of ongoing costs discussed 
above, advisers are unlikely to be challenged on this any time soon. 
 
The Consumer 
As already indicated, a key objective of the regulator in implementing the RDR was to create 
a “market which allows more consumers to have their needs and wants addressed” (FSA, 
2008:5).  Ironically, it is argued by some that the trends already identified above concerning 
the cost of advice, unwillingness to pay a fee up front, and the re-alignment of adviser 
business models, has reulted in an ‘advice gap’ (Fundscape, 2014). The estimates  concerning 
the number of people who would ‘fall out’ of the advice market post-RDR (Deloitte, 2012; 
Fundscape, 2014) or be unwilling to take advice (Clare, 2013) differ, but they all amount to 
millions of consumers, and potentially a majority of those who have taken advice in the past 
(Deloitte, 2012).  Whilst such estimates have been questioned (Europe Economics, 2014; 
NMG Consulting, 2014b), there is certainly considerable debate about the affordability of 
advice post-RDR, and the extent to which independent and restricted advice models can 
broaden their current appeal and scope.  Whatever the true extent of these issues, the 
Treasury appears to accept that there is an advice gap for those who do not have ‘significant 
wealth’ (HM Treasury, 2015), and the fact remains that millions of financial services 
consumers are not taking financial advice, with a rise in the so-called ‘DIY’ investor 
(Fundscape, 2014).  
Contrastingly, it has been argued that these trends point to a ‘guidance gap’, and  not an 
‘advice gap’.  It is argued individuals need “resources that will provide them with all of the 
information that they would need to make investment and savings decisions on their own” 
(Care, 2013:7). It is envisaged that these are people who “will be without professional 
financial advice in the post-RDR world and that will not have the confidence to make their 
own decisions in the absence of professional advice but who, nevertheless, will be in need of 
financial guidance in order to maintain the health of their personal finances” (Clare, 2013:7) 
It could certainly be argued that the creation of the Money Advice Service and the roll-out of 
Pension Guidance in the wake of the government’s recent ‘pension freedoms’ are an 
acknowledgement of the importance of ‘guidance’ in the new post-RDR landscape.  In fact, 
an increasing amount of ‘guidance’ for financial consumers is being provided by financial 
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services firms direct to customers through web-based platforms or direct from providers, with 
the former increasing by as much as 29% in 2012 and 41% in 2013 (Rice, 2013; Fundscape, 
2014). The increasing ubiquity of consumers researching and transacting online, and the ease 
of access to online services, means that transactions online have become a significant means 
of undertaking non-advised investments.  This is reflected in the increase in the use of direct 
to customer offerings which may provide information, projections and model portfolios, but 
which do not offer regulated advice. The use of devices such as filtered fund lists, pre-
presented portfolios with indicated levels of risk, and default funds can help make decisions 
easier for consumers by making use of common behavioural biases.  That said, they can 
incorporate such biases in ways that may not always work in the best interests of the 
consumer.  For example, recent research has shown how consumers in the non-advised sector 
appear to take more risk than is consistent with their risk tolerance (NMG Consulting, 
2014b:32).   
Research into the non-advised sector also found that the majority of the sample examined 
were making ‘broadly appropriate decisions’, although a significant minority were making 
mistakes such as investing in high risk products without being aware of the risk profile, 
holding a product different to the one they thought they had bought, or not being tax efficient. 
Whilst the majority of non-advised in the same research indicated they were confident about 
making the right decision (NMG Consulting, 2014b), this has to be understood in the context 
of over-confidence being a common behavioural bias (Dunning and Kruger, 1999; Dixon, 
2006).  General levels of numeracy and literacy would also tend to support the position that 
confidence is not the same as capability (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
2013).  In the context of the rise of the DIY investor and her use of internet guidance, it is 
only a short step to argue that, at least to some extent, consumer decisions are relying upon 
the expert rationale underlying the algorithms and logic which drive the various tools, 
illustrations and guides provided by ‘non-advisory’ sources.  This has led some to claim such 
developments are "blurring" the concepts of investment guidance and investment advice 
(Merret, 2013).   
In the meantime, since 2007 the regulator itself has attempted to encourage advisers, with 
little success, to increase the provision of ‘simplified advice’ – more streamlined processes 
enabling advice to be delivered in a more cost-efficient (and therefore cheaper) manner in 
 © Patrick John Ring, Glasgow School for Business and Society, 2015 
limited and less complex advisory situations.  Although the intention is to address any gap 
arising from lack of demand for ‘full’ RDR-compliant financial advice, the regulator 
maintains the same charging, disclosure of status and professionalism requirements must 
apply to any ‘simplified’ approach.  Despite the regulator twice attempting to spell out the 
specific nature of simplified advice (FSA, 2012; FCA 2014c), there has been continuing 
criticism over the financial viability of this model and the potential liabilities advisers believe 
it may lay them open to with the Financial Ombudsman Service (Norman, 2015a). The 
regulator has nevertheless now indicated it is willing to work with individual firms through 
its new ‘Project Innovate’ to overcome their concerns, although even here there has been 
criticism of the FCA’s approach (Rush, 2015).  Firms taking up the challenge of providing 
‘simplified’ advice still appear to be exceptional rather than mainstream (Budworth, 2015).    
Discussion and conclusion 
The story of retail advice sector reform in the UK has been one of seeking to secure an 
affordable, professional advice service that is driven by consumer demand.  At times it has 
felt like a search for the ‘holy grail’.  Certainly, there is a group of consumers who are more 
engaged in seeking out financial products that meet their needs.  Government pensions and 
savings policy is pushing more people in this direction, reflected by increasing ‘DIY’ 
investing.  However, engagement is not the same as capability.  Complexity, awareness and 
lack of interest, as well as levels of numeracy and literacy, are barriers to engagement. The 
litany of financial problems that populate financial pages illustrate the problems that even 
‘experienced’ retail investors encounter.  
Whilst the rise of the internet means there is a lot more help out there for individual investors 
to be ‘guided’ towards a solution, this is not regulated advice as defined.  Nevertheless, the 
assistance provided would, in many instances, appear to employ a significant amount of the 
skill and expertise that one would expect to be employed by a financial adviser in the process 
of leading to a personal recommendation to a client.  This leads to the broader question – 
what is financial ‘advice’?  In this discussion it has been suggested that, in practice, 
references to ‘advice’ can cover a ‘continuum’ ranging from the provision of information 
right up to ‘independent’ advice.  What is clear from the evidence is that using an array of 
terminology and definitions has made the position complicated and more difficult, both for 
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consumers and advisers. This also creates problems for a regulator attempting to alter the 
supply and demand dynamics in the retail advice sector.   
If we are to avoid this state of affairs, perhaps the more significant task is to enhance the 
ability of consumers and providers of ‘advice’ services both to act responsibly and accept 
responsibility for their actions (Clayton et al. 2013:10).  Here, regulatory definitions of advice 
are important to the extent they circumscribe responsibility for outcomes, and so need to be 
clear and commonly understood by all concerned.  One lesson of previous retail financial 
services scandals is that consumer perceptions and understandings about ‘advice’ and the 
behaviour of advisers at the time ‘advice’ is provided can be quite different from their 
perceptions and understandings when the outcomes of that encounter become apparent 
(Clayton et al. 2013:10).  That is why clarity and consumer understanding about the nature of 
advice is so important, and why the current lack of clarity presents such a potential (future) 
problem for the retail financial services sector.  At the same time, it emphasises the 
importance of the ‘professionalisation’ of the advice sector, and of efforts to improve the 
financial awareness and literacy of consumers. An example of responsibility arises in relation 
to costs.  Where an industry clearly has problems in communicating clearly and simply the 
cost of its services, and in some cases even clearly identifying the separate costs of the 
products being recommended, can this be regarded as acting responsibly?  Importantly, 
evidence suggests that for consumers to be encouraged to accept responsibility for their own 
actions, they need to believe those with whom they are dealing are also acting responsibly.  
Again, this suggests that the regulatory emphasis needs to be on responsibility, and less on 
economic theories of market competition.   
There is also the issue of the ‘advice gap’ created by the RDR.  Whether this is a ‘regulated 
advice gap’ or a ‘guidance gap’, as a matter of practice it appears that even the Government 
has accepted there is an ‘advice’ gap (HM Treasury, 2015).  Put another way, it is clear there 
is a consumer need to rely upon the expertise of others that is not being addressed.  The 
development and expansion of ‘simplified’ advice can help address the needs of many 
consumers who might find regulated advice unaffordable, or otherwise find themselves 
becoming ‘DIY investors.  To that extent, it can address the advice gap created by RDR.  
That said, until the fears of advisers in terms of the costs and responsibilities for this form of 
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advice are adequately assuaged (and the regulator has singularly failed in this regard over the 
past eight years) then the success of this approach may be limited.   
This advice gap has been identified by the FCA as the most important issue it faces in 
relation to the RDR (2015b).  Again, it is not legal definitions or notions of market 
competition that are at the heart of this issue, but the responsibilities that advisers and their 
clients should be expected to assume in a ‘simplified advice’ situation.   
In conclusion, it is submitted that addressing the problems facing the advice sector from the 
starting point of an analysis that focuses on competition, at least in relation to the advice 
market, is the wrong approach.  The history of retail regulatory reform, and this analysis of 
the RDR, both confirm this to be the case.  Instead, the problems of the retail sector should be 
approached from the perspective of agreed, and shared, responsibility for outcomes.  Thus the 
reforms would start from the basis of establishing agreement about principles of 
responsibility, and then moving towards enabling and ensuring each party is able to, and 
does, shoulder those responsibilities.   
There is an adage that if you keep doing the same thing, you keep getting the same result.  
Let us hope that the recent, further, review of the advice sector announced by HM Treasury 
(HM Treasury, 2015) does not turn out to be another proof of that adage. 
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